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INDIA & AUSTRALIA: A NEGLECTED LEGAL
RELATIONSHIP AND A PLAN OF ACTION
The Ron Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG*
INDIA REVISITED
On the fiftieth anniversary of Indian independence, I salute the people and
the constitution of India. I wish to reflect upon the links which Australian lawyers
share with India. We are two federal constitutional countries of the common law.
Until now our links have been comparatively few. I wish to suggest that we should
act to change this and to reinforce our neglected legal relationship.
I come to India as often as I decently can. I have always held a fascination
for India. That feeling led me, as a young man, to spend two periods in my life,
each of four months, travelling around the sub-continent, from Cape Cormorin in
the south to the Himalayas in the north. From Calcutta to Goa. In fact, I have
probably seen more of the villages and towns of India than most Indians. I present
myself to you as an admirer of this country and its timeless culture. I am proud of
the honorary degree which the National Law School of India University has conferred on me. My visits to the University are always stimulating and they have got
me thinking about the things that unite and those which divide our two countries.
A CULTURE OF NEGLECT
The neglect by Indian and Australian lawyers of each other is as tragic as it
is puzzling. It is tragic because it represents a lost opportunity for two common law
countries, which are federations, which live by the rule of law, which are governed
under democratic, parliamentary constitutions and which, in their different ways,
protect fundamental human rights and basic freedoms.
I realise that some use has been made in India of Australian constitutional
decisions where the text of the Indian Constitution bears analogies to the earlier
Australian Constitution. 1 I also realise that, occasionally, decisions ofthe courts in
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each of our countries call upon reasoning of judges in the other.2 Yet what is surprising is that there is relatively little such use. I say that this is surprising because
the language of the law in each country (or at least of the superior courts and of
the law reports) is the English language. The similarities of our federal constitutions and common law techniques are sufficient to present many potentially fruitful
analogies. Our jurists meet each other in international legal conferences. They
generally respect what they observe because of the substantial similarity of the
professional traditions which we share. The terminology and even the statutory
lineage of large areas of public and private law are so similar, at times identical,
that they invite useful comparison. For a time, we even shared, in the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, a common apex to our respective judicial and
legal systems. To this day it is not uncommon (especially in matters of criminal
law) to hear the advice of that imperial juridical tribunal, in Indian appeals, read to
Australian courts.
Yet for all this, the use made ofIndianjudicial decisions and legal innovations
in Australia is comparatively small. The reverse is equally true. Why should this be
so, when we are virtually neighbours across the Indian Ocean? When you are the
most populous common law nation on earth, with many lessons to give? Why
should it be so where each of us cherishes the integrity and professional ability of
the judges of our highest courts?
In part, the answer to my question lies in the way lawyers go about their daily
work. Problems present themselves. Lawyers must quickly find solutions. In India,
as in the United States, you have the treasury not only of the Supreme Court but of
many distinguished State courts working in areas of the law of immediate national
and general concern. Why should one bother to look into the legal system of
another country when there are so many riches at home?
In Australia, the explanation is a little different. Until 1986, the Judicial Committee ofthe Privy Council remained part of the Australian Court hierarchy. It was
only in that year, by the Australia Acts, that the last line of appeal to the Privy
Council, from State Supreme Courts was terminated.3 Although appeals from Federal courts and the High Court of Australia came to an end a decade earlier,4 the
2

A recent interesting example is the use of early Indian decision in the Australian case on so-called
Aboriginal native title: Mabo v. Queensland (No.2), (1992) 1175 CLR 1 at 36. See also Newcrest
Mining (WA) Ltd v. The Commonwealth, (1997) 71 ALJR 1346 at 1425; 147 ALR 42 at 149
where I referred to the provision of the Indian Constitution on compulsory acquisition of
property.
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Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act, 1968 (Aust); Privy Council (Appeals from the High
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residual and parallel right to appeal to a court outside Australia, sitting in London,
continued the link, long established in the minds of most Australian lawyers, between the law of Australia and the law as then expounded in England. Once,
finally, that link was severed, there has been a significant change both in the content of Australian law, as found by the courts, and in the techniques by which the
courts find the law. In a sense, as you earlier discovered in India, the obligation to
find the law entirely within one's own country encourages a measure of creativity
which will not tend to occur so long as the legal system is answerable to judges
from abroad. Self-reliance also creates a greater sense of responsibility for the
content of the law, to ensure that it is appropriate to the society and people whom
the law must serve.
Because, as a lawyer, I grew up in an Australian legal system still answerable
to the Privy Council in London, it was a common place for judges and practising
lawyers throughout Australia, including myself, to have on their shelves not only
the law books of Australian courts but also the case books from England. So long
as Australian courts were accountable to the Privy Council, it was imperative that
we should be aware of the developments of legal principle in, and thinking of, those
courts. To this day, in most judicial and Bar chambers in Australia may be found
copies of the Appeal Cases, the Weekly Law Reports, the All England Law
Reports and English textbooks and digests. Although the line of appeal to the Privy
Council has finished forever, the English case books and case citations remain.
In part, this is because judges and lawyers are creatures of habit. Once the
case books are on the shelf, the difficult thing is to cancel the subscription. It is
easier to maintain the congenial habits of a life time. Furthermore, the English
reports remain a wonderful source of comparative law material. In a very real
way, the link of the Australian legal system, which serves a comparatively small
population of nearly 20 million people, to that of England ensured that Australian
law developed, in the early period of nationhood, with the stimulus and direct contribution of one of the great legal systems of the world.5 Doubtless the Indian legal
system is also indebted to that of England. But for constitutional and other reasons,
and because it long ago severed its link with the Privy Council, India has been
more eclectic in its use of legal decisions from other places.
Now, Australia is taking the same course. But it was not always so.
WORKING AT THE LINKS
Soon after my appointment as President of the New South Wales Court of
Appeal (the busiest appellate court in Australia) I struck a blow for creative links

5
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between the Australian and Indian legal systems. The case was Osmond v. Public Service Board of New South Wales.6 The question was whether the common
law in Australia had advanced to the point that a recipient of statutory power
would be obliged, when asked, to state reasons for an exercise of that power
affecting the interests of the person requesting the reasons. The common law in
Australia had certainly advanced to the point that judicial officers were required to
give reasons.? However there was English authority to the effect that administrators were not so required.s Courts repeatedly said that giving reasons was good
administrative policy.9 But they would not support their pious statements withjudicial orders.
In the course of my opinion, in which I upheld the right to reasons, I invoked
developments in the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand, Fiji and
other common law jurisdictions. I then turned to India: 10
"In India, the Supreme Court of India has elaborated, in a series of recent
cases, a general requirement for administrative tribunals to give reasons for
their decisions. Sometimes the requirements have been founded on the 'elementary requirements' of a 'quasi judicial process' (see e.g. Vedachala
Mudaliar v. State of Madras AIR 1952 Mad 276 at 280; Commissioner of
Income Tax, Bombay v. Walchand and Co (Pvt) Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1435);
sometimes in the Indian Constitution special leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court (see e.g. Mahavir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1970 SC
1302; Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd v. Shyam Sunder AIR 1961 SC 1669;
Bhagat Raja v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1606); sometimes in the review and supervisory jurisdiction of the State High Courts (see e.g. Ragnath
v. Daulatarao AIR 1975 SC 2146); sometimes in the rule of law (see eg
Mahavir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh at 1304); and more recently in
the principles of natural justice."
The use of the principles of natural justice derived from the common law of
England, as a basis for the requirement to state reasons, has received its most
notable support in two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of India in which the
leading judgments were given by Bhagwati J., namely Siemens Engineering and
Manufacturing Co of India Ltd v. Union of India,11 and Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India. 12
6

[1984] 3 NSWLR 447 (CA).

7

Pettitt v. Dunkley, [1971] 1 NSWLR 376 (CA).

8
9
10
11

R v. Gaming Boardfor Great Britain; Ex parte Benaim, [1970] 2 QB 417 (CA).
Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [1971] 2 QB 175 (CA) at 190-191.
Ibid., at 461.
AIR 1976 SC 1785.

12

AIR 1978 SC 597.
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In Siemens, Bhagwati J. said that the rule requiring reasons to be given was
"like the principle of audi alteram partem, a place of principle and natural justice"J3. The role of 'natural justice' in administrative law is an important principle
intended to 'invest law with fairness and to secure justice' was stressed by Bhagwati
J. in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. 14 Calling on the language of Lord Morris
of Borth-y-gest in Wiseman v. Borneman, 15 at 302, Bhagwati J. suggested that the
'soul of natural justice is "fair play in action" and that is why it has received the
widest recognition throughout the democratic world.' In that case the Supreme
Court of India held that the Passport Authority was obliged to supply reasons for
impounding the passport of Mrs. Maneka Gandhi. The case is complicated by
reference to the Indian Constitution and various statutory provisions. However, the
basis for the obligation to provide reasons would appear to have been expressed to
lie in the duties of or akin to those imposed in this country by the rules of natural
justice."
In the Court of Appeal, Justice Priestly agreed with the result favoured by
me. Justice Glass dissented. The High Court of Australia granted special leave to
appeal from our decision. On the appeal there was barely disguised impatience
with my citation of so much foreign authority. Chief Justice Sir Harry Gibbs expressed his opinion on the Indian cases thus:
16

"Kirby P (Sic) referred to a line ofIndian decisions in which it has been held
to be 'settled law' that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a
quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it
makes." Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co of India LId v. Union of India. 17 This, it was there said, is a basic principle of natural justice.
These decisions appear to state the common law in India, although without a
detailed knowledge of the course of decisions in that country in would be
hazardous to assume that they have not been influenced by the provisions of
the Constitution of India or by Indian statutes .... When the rules of the common law of Australia are unclear or uncertain assistance may be gained from
a consideration of the decisions of other jurisdictions, but when the rules are
clear and settled, they ought not to be disturbed because the common law of
other countries may have developed differently in a different context. If the

13

at 1789.

14

at 625.

15

[1971] AC 297 at 302.

16

Public Service Board (NSW) v. Osmond, (1986) 156 CLR 656 at 668.
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common law of India ... requires reasons to be given for administrative decisions, it is different from that of Australia."
The High Court of Australia reversed the majority decision of the Court of
Appeal. To this day, in Australia, the common law does not require officials to give
reasons for their decisions.
My purpose is not to dwell on the detail of the particular case or the sting of
reversal which, occasionally administered, may be good for the judicial soul. High
authority of Indian courts and other courts of the common law world (indeed, if
relevant, of civil law courts and international tribunals) would probably now be
considered in the High Court of Australia greater detail in a case involving questions of general legal principle. Endeavouring to unlock the legal mind from the
capture of the English case books and to release Australian lawyers from the longheld connection with English legal doctrine has been a major contribution of the
High Court of Australia in recent years. In Cook v. Cook, 18 that Court, in the year
of the final severance of the formal link between the Australian judicial system and
the Privy Council, marked out the new regime. Commenting that the court under
appeal in that case had declined to follow judicial comments of two of the foremost
Justices of the High Court of Australia (Latham CJ and Dixon J) whilst regarding
itself as "constrained to accept the reasoning of the majority of the English Court
of Appeal", the High Court of Australia saidl9:
"Whatever may have been the justification for such statements in times where
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was the ultimate court of appeal
or one of the ultimate courts of appeal to this country, those statements should
no longer be seen as binding upon Australian courts. The history of this country and of the common law makes it inevitable and desirable that the courts of
this country will continue to obtain assistance and guidance from the learning
and reasoning of United Kingdom courts, just as Australian courts benefit
from the learning and reasoning of other great common law courts. Subject,
perhaps, to the special position of decisions ofthe House of Lords given in the
period in which appeals lay from this country to the Privy Council, the precedents of other legal systems are not binding and are useful only to the degree
of the persuasiveness of their reasoning".
As a consequence of this stance, the High Court of Australia has become
distinctly more eclectic. It is now not uncommon to have decisions cited from
many jurisdictions of the common law and far beyond. In De L v. Director-Gen-

18 (1986) 162 CLR 376.
19

Ibid., at 39 per Mason, Wilson, Deance and Dawson 11.
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eral, NSW Department of Community Serviceio , a recent case involving the
Convention on International Child Abduction, the Court made copious reference to decisions in jurisdictions as far from our ordinary legal traditions as Sweden, Germany, Israel, Argentina and Switzerland, as well as the more traditional
sources of England, Scotland, Ireland, Canada, New Zealand and the United States
of America.
The advent of technology has presented many global and transitional legal
problems. These range from child abduction to international business disputes and
common problems in the field of human rights. Technology can also rescue us
from imprisonment in the English and Australian case-books which still line the
shelves of most lawyers' offices. Now, on-line legal services provide ready means
to capture the most up to date and specifically relevant material from jurisdictions
which once would, for practical purposes, have been inaccessible. Under the constraints within which they usually operate, lawyers cannot be expected to become
masters of the law in a multitude of foreign jurisdiction other than their own. However, the common problem which courts today face and the global similarity of
many legal issues require of us all, especially in the higher judiciary, an openminded attitude to the assistance which we may receive from each other. That
assistance may be comparatively rare between countries such as Australia or
India and Argentina. The legal traditions are so different. But as between India
and Australia there are so many links of concept and legal theory that we owe it to
each other to become more familiar with relevant fields of jurisprudence so that
we may take advantage of the experience which each has to offer.
LAW REFORM AND LEGAL CREATIVITY
Coinciding with the termination of appeals to a court outside the Australian
legal hierarchy has been a remarkable period of law reform and legal renewal in
Australia. It is worth mentioning this in the present context because, even a superficial know ledge of the developments of the law in India demonstrates that India is
also going through a period of considerable creativity in the law, some of it originating in the Supreme Court.
In 1981 the Supreme Court of India held that the right of an indigent person to
receive legal assistance was a fundamental human right which the courts would
uphold.21 In Australia, although the courts have not gone so far, it has been held
(reversing earlier authoritl2) that a court of trial may stay the trial of a person

20

(1996) 187 CLR 640.

21

Khatriv.StateofBihar,

22

Mcinnis v. The Queen. (1979) 143 CLR 575.

(1981) 1 SCC627.
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unable to afford legal representation where, if the trial were forced to proceed
with the accused unrepresented, the result would be an unfair trial.23 Clearly, each
of these decisions has considerable significance for the operation of the courts and
for the budgets provided by the legislation for legal assistance. The tradition of
adversary, trial, which Australia and India have inherited from England, posits, for
its effectiveness, at least in complex and serious cases, that parties will have access to accurate legal advice and skilled legal representation. The full extent of
"the entitlement" to legal representation in Australia is still being worked OUt.24
Whether the principle applies to an appeal against conviction after trial has not yet
been determined. How such a "right" could be enforced where the remedy of stay
was not available is likewise left to conjecture. But it is plain that Indian and Australian courts, at the highest level, are unwilling to condone, or participle in, a charade of justice in which there is an appearance of a fair trial but the reality is
lacking.
The Supreme Court of India in S.P. Gupta v. Union of Indii5 took a strong
stand to ensure judicial redress to any person claiming legal injury or to determinate class of persons who (by reason of poverty, helplessness, social or economically disadvantaged position or disability) were unable to approach the Court for
relief. In such a case it was held that any member of the public, acting bonde fin
and not for oblique considerations, could maintain an action on their behalf. This
amicus curiae could seek judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to
such a person or determinate class of persons.26 Although Australian law has not
gone as far as this on the issue of standing, it has undoubtedly advanced in recent
years.27 Proposals for further reform have been made by the Australian Law Reform Commission.28
The development of the common law on standing is one area in which I
believe Australian courts, like those of many other lands of the common law, have
lessons to learn from India. The sheer complexity of social and economic problems
in India, and the common disability of the other branches of government, have
caused people to seek redress in the judicial branch. In a series of creative deci23

Dietrich v. The Queen, (1992) 177 CLR 292.

24

cf New South Wales v. Canellis, (1994) 181 CLR 309.

25

1981 (Supp) SCC 87.

26

S. J. Sorabjee, "Public Interest Litigation for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights: The
Indian Experience", 1996, New Zealand Law Conference Proceedings 40-48 at 41.

27

Onus v. Alcoa of Australia Ltd. (1981) 149 CLR 27,38,46,57; H Burmester, "Locus Standi in
Constitutional Litigation" in H Lee and G Winterton, Australian Constitutional Perspectives,
1992 at 180 cited Lindon v. The Commonwealth (No.2), (1996) 70 AUR 541 (HC) at 547.

28

[1995] Reform* at 35. (*Reform is the Journal of the Australian Law Reform Commission).
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sions, the Supreme Court of India has responded in a positive and effective way.
Whilst judges must beware of claiming expertise and performing functions outside
those proper to the judicial role,29 that role is itself not frozen in time. Nor is it
determined for us, forever, by the traditions of the English law. Carefully and thoughtfully the judicial role may be adapted to new needs, as the Supreme Court of India
has undertaken. This is an area of the jurisprudence of India which, I believe, could
be studied with advantage in my own country.
One relevant law reform task which is of interest in Australia has been assigned to the Australian Law Reform Commission. The Commission has been
asked to examine the adversarial system of litigation in Australia with respect to
administrative law, family law and civil litigation proceedings in courts and tribunals
exercising federal jurisdiction. The terms of reference to the Commission exclude
analysis of criminal proceedings where the accusatorial trial is deeply entrenched.
Constitutional questions may arise in any attempts to change the basic system in
Australia, about which I must express no opinion. However, because India and
Australia share the adversarial tradition it may be of interest for you to know of
this inquiry.
In reality, pure adversarial and inquisitorial systems are now hard to find.
Most jurisdictions have a mixture of the two techniques. Some features of the
inquisitorial system have become grafted onto court systems in Australia, such that
pro-active judges are much more vigorously controlling, and directing, the efficient
resolution of cases. In Italy, which is predominantly an inquisitorial system, aspects
of the adversarial system have been introduced into the procedures of criminal
trials. One study discovered that passive defence lawyers and bureaucratic prosecutors of the civil law tradition were culturally ill-suited to the new adversarial
contest. They were not disposed to fight cases nor motivated to seek their efficient
resolution. I suspect that this is not a problem for Indian or Australian advocates.
Nonetheless, in Federal and State jurisdictions, and in a myriad of tribunals in Australia, new procedures have been introduced, in the nature of "case management"
to enhance court control over litigation. The parties no longer set the pace and
dictate the procedural steps of litigation. This languid approach of the past has
tended to clog the courts and reduce efficiency.
Another innovation in Australia has been the training of judges. This is an
example ofthe borrowing which is occurring from the traditions of the civil law. In
the French legal system, for example, judges graduate from the National School

29

cf Willson v. Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affair, (1997) 70 ALJR 743; 138

ALR 220.
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for Judges into a career structure.30 They are not chosen, as judges in Australia
and India typically are, from the ranks of independent senior practising lawyers. In
the complex world of the modern courtroom, it is now regarded as imperative to
give the new judicial officer training in a wide range of subjects which may be
required injudiciallife and of which the new judge may have little experience. The
training will encompass fields of new legislation (such as for redress of discrimination), new ideas (such as gender sensitivity), new legal topics (such as the impact
of HIV/AIDS on the law)3' and old problems which we are only now facing upto
(such as stress and its impact on judicial life). I have myself lectured in the Australian judicial course on the topic of judicial stress.32It made the audience squirm
a bit. But when they got used to speaking honestly and openly about the problem of
stress, its importance for judicial life was accepted.
Australia, like India has a most creative and professional law reform system.
Most law reform in Australia is achieved through the political process, i.e. through
the initiatives of government and the public service. It is in this way that we have
recently secured important statutory reforms: a new national Corporations Law, 33
products liability,34the rights of Aboriginal Australians,35the redress of gender bias
in the law,36to name but a few. Other important reforms have been secured through
the work of the institutional law reform bodies, Federal and State. The Australian
Law Reform Commission, which at one time I chaired, is working on a wide range
oftopics extending from the inquiry into the adversarial system Gust mentioned),
through the impact of law upon children and young persons, a reconsideration of
the handling of complaints against federal Police, a review of the law on crossborder civil remedies, a consideration of the law on exchange traded derivatives, a
review of the Freedom of Information Act, 1982 (Aust), a consideration of federal laws on disability services and, finally, completion on the review of the of
standing. State Law Reform Commissions in Australia are working on topics ranging from the reform of sentencing law, the law affecting intellectual disability, defamation law, uniform succession laws, consent to medical treatment for young people, review of the law of evidence to such basic problems as pawnbrokers legislation and review of the Justices Act.

30

D. Kinley in (1996) Reform at 40.

31

M.D. Kirby, "The Role of the Judiciary and HIV Law", in D.C. Jayasuriya (ed), HIV Law,
Ethics and Human Rights - Text and Materials. UNDP, Delhi, 1995.

32

M.D. Kirby, "Judicial Stress", (1995) 13 Aust Bar Rev. 101.

33

[1991] Reform at 15; (1992) Reform at 27; [1993] Reform at 6.

34

[1991] Reform at 105.

35

[1991] Reform at 94.

36

[1993] Reform at 3,18.
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Whilst most legal reform comes, as it should in a democracy, from elected
law-makers, the courts have also played a role in the modemisation of Australian
Law. Particularly since 1986, the High Court of Australia has been prepared, where
appropriate, to take bold steps in the development oflegal principle. Probably the
best known of these was the Court's decision in Mabo v. Queensland (No 2).37 In
that case, the High Court held that the rights to land of Aboriginal Australians and
Torres Strait Islanders survived the acquisition of sovereignty over Australia by
the Crown. Previously it had been thought that such acquisition of sovereignty had
destroyed so-called native title rights. The Court exploded this theory. As a result,
the Australian Parliament enacted the Native Title Act, 1993 (Aust) which affords
procedures whereby Australia's indigenous people may make claims to native title
which are determined by a Tribunal and the Court.
There have been many other bold strokes by the High Court; but none as bold
as this. In the field of criminal law the decision in McKinney v. The Queen38 may
be noted. It laid down new rules for the admissibility of uncorribotate and unconfirmed testimony by police and like officials. The rules were designed to reduce
the risks oppression and of conviction of accused persons on false evidence.
The Criminal Law Journal in Australia has urged comparative law analysis of Indian court decisions on criminal law. 39 The editors point out that the Indian
Penal Code was adopted in other countries of the region, such as Burma, Sri
Lanka, Malaysia and Singapore. Some of its notions have lessons for criminal law
in Australia, particularly in those States which have adopted a Code:40
"We therefore encourage Australian law reform bodies and, indeed, our judges,
to refer to the Indian Penal Code as a possible model for the reform of substantive criminal law..... Such a move would also signal to our Asian neighbours that, in fundamental respects, our views about justice, right and wrong,
crime and punishment are much the same. This in turn could foster shared
ways of thinking about and dealing with crime" .41

37

[1992] 175 CLR l.

38

McKinney v. The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468.

39

(1996) 20 Crim U at 125.

40

M. Sornarajah, "Duress and Murder in Commonwealth Law", (1981) 30 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly at 660; M. Cheang, "The Insanity Defence in Singapore", (1985)
14 Anglo-American Law Rev at 245; G. Peiris, "Involuntary Manslaughter in Commonwealth
Law", (1985) 5 Legal Studies at 21; S. Yeo, "Lessons on Provocation from the Indian Penal
Code". (1992) 41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 612.

41

Editorial, "Reform in the Criminal Law: Looking East", (1996) 20 Crim U 125 at 126.
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One area of the law where the Supreme Court of India has recently examined a broad band of jurisprudence
in other common law countries concerns the
law of defamation and privacy. I refer to R Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu.42
This decision is interesting because it held that a local government authority, like
other institutions exercising governmental power, could not maintain a suit for damages for defamation. A similar problem had been presented to me in the New
South Wales Court of Appeal in Ballina Shire Council v. Ringland.43 Like Jeevan
Reddy 1., I had access to English decisions relevant to the point.44 But he does not
appear to have been referred to the decision of the Appellate Division in South
Africa in Die Spoorbond v. South African Railway/5 to the same effect. I was
not referred to the Indian decision although it would have been most helpful.
The second important feature of Rajagopal's Case arises from the use made
of implications deri ved from the Indian Constitution. The Court found that the right
to privacy was implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Indian Constitution.46 In Australia. the High Court has recently derived implications
of a constitutional freedom of communication on matters relevant to political, economic and like concerns47 although such rights are nO,t spelt out expressly in the
text of the Constitution. Like the Indian Supreme Court, the High Court of Australia has been concerned to perform its function with a full awareness of the
developments on constitutional principle in other common law countries. This is the
approach which Jeevan Reddy J. adopted in Rajagopal. I do not doubt that it will
continue to be the approach adopted in Australia. This does not mean blindly following constitutional authority of other countries. The constitutional language will
be different. The societies in which the law must operate are different. But, in
matters of fundamentals, it is usually helpful to have one's own thinking illuminated
by the writing found in the opinions of the highest courts of other nations, particu-

42

(1994) 6 SCC 632.

43

(1994) 33 NSWLR 640 (CA).

44

See e.g. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534 referred to ibid.,
646.

45

(1946) AD 999 (SAAD).

46

(1994) 6 SCC 632 at 639.

47

Theophanous v. The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd and Anol; (1994) 182 CLR 104; Lange v.
Australian Broadcasting Corporation. (1997) 71 AUR 818; 145 ALR 96. For commentary see
J. Miller, "The End of Freedom, Method in Theophanous", (1996) 1 Newcastle L Rev 39; H.P.
Lee, "The Australian High Court and Implied Fundamental Guarantees", [1993] Public Law
606; A. Fraser, "False Hopes: Implied Rights and Popular Sovereignty", (1994) 16 Sydney Law
Rev 213; W. Rich, "Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in Australia: An American
Perspective", (1993) 12 Uni ofTas Law Rev 150; T. Jones, "Legal Protection for Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms: European Lessons for Australia?", (1994) 22 Fed L Rev 57.
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lady those which share the same legal tradition. The way in which those courts
grapple with difficult problems will surely help to illuminate the path for those that
come later.

A PLAN OF ACTION
What can we do to improve the awareness in India and Australia of each
other's laws? How do we break the spell of ignorance which has created such a
diversion between two neighbouring countries with such similar legal systems?
How do we build the links which will not only reinforce a natural association between our two countries in this area but also facilitate business and economic
contacts, dependent on law?
I propose nine steps which could be taken without a great deal of cost:

1. Visits
There should be more visits and lecture tours by leading Indian and Australianjurists to each other's country. The Australia India Council has begun this process. It has arranged for me to return to India in January 1997 to give lectures in
New Delhi, Bombay and Bangalore. Through the good offices of my friend, and
colleague in the International Commission of Jurists, Mr Fali Nariman, the Bar
Association of India has invited me to deliver a lecture in its annual series. The
Australian legal profession should reciprocate. It is hoped that the Chief Justice of
India, or a Justice of the Supreme Court of India, will later in 1997, give return
lectures in Australia. Legal links have been established between India and lawyers
from the United Kingdom and the United States. We should explore the creation of
such links between India and Australia.

2. Professional bodies
There should be more contact between the professional bodies in India and
Australia. Already, individual practitioners are linked through the association known
as Lawasia. The thirtieth anniversary of that body was recently celebrated in
Canberra, Australia. The keynote speaker, suitably enough, was Justice Krishna
Iyer of India. He, and a group of jurists (including from India) visited Chief Justice
Brennan and me in the High Court of Australia in Canberra. Such contacts could
be put on a more routine and permanent basis. But this would require initiatives
from the professional bodies of the legal profession themselves. It would necessitate
an interest to explore each other's legal systems. A contribution could be made by
governments, by simplifying visa requirements. I have discovered that visas to
enter India are expensive. They are given for a limited duration only. The same is
doubtless true of visas to enter Australia. It may be hoped that this will change.
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3. Publications
The libraries of the Supreme Court of India and the High Court of Australia
carry ample material from each other's jurisdiction. But it would be no bad thing if
the Australian government were to fund subscriptions of the Australian Law Journal to be deposited in the High Courts around India for circulation to the judges.
Only when the judges become aware of the jurisprudence of another country will
questions be asked of the profession that will send them searching for relevant
analogies and precedents. Subscriptions to legal periodicals are expensive. Complete collections are extremely costly. Yet a few well planted contemporary copies
of the general Australian legal review, surveying the scene (as the Australian
Law Journal does) could bear fruit. It might produce reciprocation. Both India
and Australia still look to England for legal material. Yet, in all truth, the constitutional arrangements of Australia are much closer to those of India than are those
of England.
4. Judicial training
Consideration might be given to funding the participation of a newly appointed
Indian judge or judges in the orientations and training courses given for Australian
judges. Judicial officers from New Zealand and Papua-New Guinea take part in
these courses. It could be mutually beneficial to have participation by new Indian
judges. It would help stimulate the thinking of all. It would also create friendships
which would endure and expand.
5. Professional

reciprocity

As India's economic advancement continues, its importance in the global and
regional economies will become more obvious. Similarly, many Australian businesses
are now looking for opportunities in the region. Capital markets are increasingly
international in operation. With investment comes the need for legal services.
Consideration should be given to reciprocity of legal qualifications, at least for
limited and specialised practice of law. The old notion that lawyers are prisoners of
their admitting jurisdiction must be adjusted to the needs for specialist legal
practitioners in connection with trans border transactions. Indian corporations
operating in Australia will require Indian legal experts and vice versa. Admitting
authorities should become more flexible in the provision of qualified practising rights,
to reflect the needs for legal services as their businesses venture beyond local
borders.

6. Universities
It would be a good thing if a Chair oflndian Law were established at one of
the Australian Universities. The most natural place for a specialisation in the topic
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might be in Western Australia where there is a large Indian community. The physical proximity oflndia is more keenly appreciated there. As business links increase,
the need for Australianjurists to be aware oflndian law, particularly in the fields of
commerce and public law, will become apparent. Already some law schools (including at the University of Sydney and the University of Technology, Sydney) are
offering specialised courses in the law of countries of East Asia. Curtin University,
with the Indian Ocean Centre might give thought to the establishment of a specialised Chair in Indian Law. Funding for such a proposal should be considered by the
Australian Government. Indian Universities already include distinguished jurists
who have taught in Australian Law Schools, including Professor Upendra Baxi of
the University of New Delhi. As a young tutor at Sydney University, he once
taught me!

7. Scholarships
Consideration might also be given to increasing, on a reciprocal basis, the
number of scholarships by which young lawyers in India and Australia may take
courses in universities in each other's country. This would help them to refine their
knowledge of the legal system of the other. Comparative law is always useful to
lawyers of our tradition who, throughout life, must argue by analogy. As the universities of Britain and the United States close their doors to, or impose prohibitive
costs upon, overseas students, those in the region should explore the potential to
meet the desire of young graduates to pursue post-graduate education at a cost
which they can afford.

8. Law schools
Judges and other senior practitioners should consider accepting appointments
as Visiting Professors in Universities in India and Australia. I have been appointed
an Honorary Visiting Professor at the National Law School in Bangalore. I have
given lectures there in 1995. I will return early in 1997. These occasions provide a
useful opportunity for dialogue and for learning about major legal trends. Even
short-term appointments of this kind are useful. The costs involved are minimal.
Within Australia, the National aid agency, AUSAID, should explore such possibilities with Australian universities where undergraduates could be enriched and stimulated by news of the creative lawyering which occurs in India.

9. Young lawyers
The future belongs to the young. There are young lawyers' associations in
India and Australia. On my return from Gujarat and Rajasthan earlier this year I
took with me the journal of the Young Lawyers' Association of India. I arranged
for the Young Lawyers of New South Wales to establish an exchange. For the
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most part, the lawyers of my generation lacked the imagination to perceive the
similarities and advantages which would lie in creating links with jurists in India.
They flew over India on their way to England. In truth, their minds were locked
into an attitude fixed in colonial times. The law and its institutions have changed.
Their minds had not. Today, young lawyers in Australia and India are much more
open-minded. They are aware of regional imperatives and the economic opportunities which they present. The more contact that can be established between young
lawyers in India and Australian, the better. A starting point lies in the professional
associations and in invitations offered to key players who will take back the message of the many similarities that exist between our respective approaches to the
law.
Two countries sharing so many historical, linguistic, constitutional and legal
links, such as Australia and India, should have more connection than they have.
The Indian stereotype of Australia is probably as false as the Australian stereotype ofIndia. The time has come, on the brink of a new millennium, to shatter the
stereotypes and to forge a strong new relationship of neighbourliness and mutual
awareness. It does not require much for us to achieve it. But will lawyers have the
imagination to seize the chance of new horizons?

